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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether civil claims against a website operator 
were properly dismissed under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, 
where they sought to hold the website liable for 
publishing content posted by third parties, and for 
editorial decisions about publishing and prohibiting 
content. 
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RULE 29.6 STATEMENT 
Pursuant  to  Rule  29.6  of  the  Rules  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  
Respondents make the following disclosure:  
Backpage.com, LLC is a Delaware limited 
liability company that is a subsidiary of and owned 
by several other privately held companies, 
respectively: IC Holdings, LLC; Dartmoor Holdings, 
LLC; Atlantische Bedrijven C.V.; Kickapoo River 
Investments, LLC; Lupine Investments LLC; and 
Amstel River Holdings, LLC.  No publicly held 
corporation owns any interest in Backpage.com, LLC 
or its parent companies.  
Camarillo Holdings, LLC, is owned by Leeward 
Holdings LLC, which is owned by Medalist Holdings 
Inc.  Each of these entities is privately held, and no 
publicly held corporation owns an interest in any of 
them.  
New Times Media, LLC is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Voice Media Group, Inc.  No publicly 
held corporation owns an interest in either company.
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INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a straightforward application 
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 
which precludes suits against interactive computer 
services for content provided by third-party users.  
In the two decades since Congress enacted Section 
230, hundreds of cases have interpreted the law in a 
manner consistent with Congress’s intent to foster 
free speech on the Internet and to encourage online 
providers to self-police content rather than face 
potentially crippling liability.  The First Circuit’s 
decision affirming dismissal in this case comports 
with the “near-universal agreement that Section 230 
should not be construed grudgingly.”  As courts have 
observed for 20 years, Section 230 was intended to 
prevent the “obvious chilling effect” that would occur 
if websites were held liable for third-party content, 
given the enormous amounts of such content posted 
online every day.  App. 10a (quoting Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)).   
The First Circuit, in its unanimous panel opinion 
(joined by former Justice Souter, sitting by desig-
nation), correctly concluded that dismissal in this 
case was “rooted in positive law,” and “fits comfort-
ably” within established Section 230 precedent.  App. 
3a, 14a.  It is undisputed that the online ads giving 
rise to petitioners’ claims were created, developed 
and posted by third-party users, not Backpage.com.  
The First Circuit correctly held that petitioners’ 
arguments to impose liability on Backpage.com for 
these ads were merely attempts to “end run” Section 
230, which did “not cast the slightest doubt” on the 
conclusion that dismissal was proper.  App. 20a.  
This too is entirely consistent with Section 230 case 
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law holding that plaintiffs may not evade Section 
230 by artful pleading. 
The Petition for Certiorari misconstrues the 
decision below and attempts to invent disagreement 
among the circuits where none exists.  Petitioners 
contend the First Circuit decided that websites are 
immune from liability whenever “content created by 
a third party was a part of the chain of causation 
leading to the plaintiff’s injury.”  Petition at 11.  The 
First Circuit said no such thing.  Rather, it held that 
Petitioners’ claims amounted to an attack on 
Backpage.com’s editorial decisions and practices, 
which the uniform case law holds that Section 230 
protects.  Petitioners’ assertion that the Ninth 
Circuit “explicitly rejected the First Circuit’s view,” 
Petition at 13, both relies on this mischaracter-
ization of the First Circuit’s decision and miscon-
strues the few cases that have denied Section 230 
immunity based on circumstances entirely different 
from this case. 
The Petition for Certiorari raises no issue that 
warrants review by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Section 230 of the CDA 
“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service.” Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 330.  Section 230(c)(1) states:  “No 
provider … of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any infor-
mation provided by another information content pro-
vider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  Section 230 expressly 
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preempts all civil claims and all state-law claims 
whether civil or criminal.  Id. § 230(e)(3) (“[N]o 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law 
that is inconsistent with this section.”). 
Congress enacted Section 230 to achieve two 
goals.  First, it “wanted to encourage the unfettered 
and unregulated development of free speech on the 
Internet, and to promote the development of 
e-commerce.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. 
v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 
2000) (Section 230 is meant “to promote freedom of 
speech”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (statute intended to 
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists for the Internet”).  Second, it 
sought to encourage online providers to “self-police” 
for potentially harmful or offensive material by 
providing immunity for such efforts.  Batzel, 333 
F.3d at 1028; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).   
As courts interpreting Section 230 have 
uniformly held, the statute reflects a “‘policy choice 
… not to deter harmful online speech through the … 
route of imposing tort liability on companies that 
serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially 
injurious messages.’”  Universal Commc’n Sys. Inc. 
v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31).  Congress 
sought to eliminate the “obvious chilling effect” that 
such liability would cause, “given the volume of 
material communicated through [the Internet], the 
difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful speech, 
and the relative lack of incentives to protect lawful 
speech.”  Id. at 418-19 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 
331).  “Section 230 therefore sought to prevent 
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lawsuits from shutting down websites ….”  Batzel, 
333 F.3d at 1028.   
Thus, courts have consistently interpreted 
Section 230 to establish immunity for online 
providers, as the First Circuit held in this case:  
“There has been near-universal agreement that 
Section 230 should not be construed grudgingly.”  
App. 10a; see also id. 11a (noting the “broad 
construction accorded to section 230” resulting in the 
“capacious conception of what it means to treat a 
website operator as the publisher or speaker of 
information provided by a third-party”).  Nine other 
circuit courts have interpreted Section 230 the same 
way, recognizing the broad immunity and protec-
tions it provides.1 Hundreds of reported decisions 
have intepreted Section 230, and “[a]ll but a handful 
… find that the website is entitled to immunity from 
                                            
 
1 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985 n.3; 
Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (noting a “consensus” that “§ 230(c) provides broad 
immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third 
parties”); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 
(11th Cir. 2006) (“federal circuits have interpreted [§ 230] to 
establish broad federal immunity to any cause of action that 
would make service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user”) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(same); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(“Courts have construed the immunity provisions in § 230 
broadly ….”);Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 
406-07 (6th Cir. 2014); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 
1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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liability.”  Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012).  And for its part Congress—far 
from disavowing Section 230 as the courts have 
interpreted it—has extended the statute to preempt 
the enforcement of certain foreign judgments.  App. 
44a (citing 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1)). 
B. Petitioners’ Claims Against 
Backpage.com 
Backpage.com operates an online classified 
advertising service through which users can post ads 
in a range of categories.  App. 4a.  The website is 
organized geographically by state and municipality.  
Id.; see also Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. 
Supp. 2d 805, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).  Users post 
millions of ads every month, making Backpage.com 
the second-largest online classified ad service in the 
country, after Craigslist.  Backpage.com, LLC v. 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 
2012).  
Petitioners (plaintiffs below) alleged that pimps 
trafficked them for sex and posted ads about them in 
the escort section of Backpage.com.  Petitioners 
conceded that all of the ads were created and posted 
by the pimps (or by Petitioners themselves at their 
pimps’ direction).  App. 12a.  They expressly dis-
claimed any contention that Backpage.com created 
or developed any of the content of the ads.  Id. 11a 
n.6; see also App. 48a (“the Doe plaintiffs recognize 
that defendants did not author the content of the 
offending ads”).   
Instead, Petitioners alleged (largely in conclusory 
fashion) that Backpage.com’s voluntary efforts to 
prevent misuse of the site were inadequate and 
amounted to a mere ruse to “facilitate” crime. For 
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example, Petitioners complained that Backpage.com 
did not require phone number verification, that 
phone numbers can be displayed in advertisements 
in alternative formats, that photographs uploaded 
for use in ads were shorn of metadata, and that 
users have the option to hide email addresses in 
postings.  App. 5a-6a.  Based on these and other 
similar allegations, Petitioners sued Backpage.com 
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthor-
ization Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, et seq. 
(“TVPRA”), the Massachusetts Anti-Trafficking Act, 
Mass. Gen. Laws c. 265 § 50, and other causes of 
action.   
C. Proceedings Below  
Respondents (defendants below) moved to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were based entirely on 
harms allegedly incurred from Backpage.com’s 
publication of advertisements posted by third 
parties—exactly the kind of claims that are 
precluded by Section 230.  The District Court 
(Stearns, J.), dismissed the action in its entirety.   
Petitioners appealed, and the First Circuit 
(Barron, Selya and Souter, JJ.), unanimously 
affirmed.  The panel noted that in enacting Section 
230, Congress recognized that websites “may have 
an infinite number of users generating an enormous 
amount of potentially harmful content, and holding 
website operators liable for that content ‘would have 
an obvious chilling effect’ in light of the difficulty of 
screening posts for potential issues.”  App. 10a 
(quoting  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331).  Accordingly, the 
uniform Section 230 case law reflects a “capacious 
conception” of what it means to treat a website as a 
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publisher of third-party content.  App. 11a-12a.  The 
court recognized that the “ultimate question” does 
not depend on how plaintiffs seek to characterize 
their claims, but rather on whether the “cause of 
action necessarily requires that the defendant be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of content 
provided by another.”  App. 12a (citing cases).   
The court found plaintiffs’ argument that their 
claims sought to hold Backpage.com liable not for 
publishing but for “participation in sex trafficking” 
“comprise[d] more cry than wool,” because at bottom, 
plaintiffs’ allegations all concern “the formulation of 
precisely the sort of website policies and practices” 
that Section 230(c)(1) protects.  App. 13a.  Accord-
ingly, the First Circuit found that “[t]he case at hand 
fits comfortably within [Section 230’s] construct” and 
that “[p]recedent cinches the matter.” App. 14a.  
Petitioners sought rehearing en banc before the 
Court of Appeals, which was denied.  This Petition 
followed.  
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT 
I. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
IS CONSISTENT WITH UNIFORM 
SECTION 230 CASE LAW 
IMMUNIZING ONLINE PROVIDERS 
FOR CLAIMS BASED ON THIRD-
PARTY CONTENT.   
The First Circuit’s decision was directly in line 
with the consensus among the circuit courts that 
Section 230 precludes claims against websites for 
their actions and practices in publishing third-party 
content.  Petitioners’ argument that the First 
Circuit’s reasoning creates a circuit split is based on 
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a misreading of the decision below and a skewed 
analysis of Section 230 cases generally.  
A. The First Circuit Did Not Adopt 
a “But For” Causation Test. 
The First Circuit upheld dismissal of Petitioners’ 
claims because they expressly sought to hold 
Backpage.com “‘liable for its exercise of a publisher’s 
traditional editorial functions – such as deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
[third-party] content.’”  App. 10a (quoting Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 330).  The court explained that appellants’ 
claims “[w]ithout exception” turned on “Backpage’s 
decisions about how to treat postings,” including 
such things as “the lack of phone number verifi-
cation, the rules about whether a person may post 
after attempting to enter a forbidden term, and the 
procedure for uploading photographs.”  It found that 
decisions about “the structure and operation of the 
Backpage website,” “which reflect choices about 
what content can appear on the website and in what 
form, are editorial choices that fall within the 
purview of traditional publisher functions.”  App. 
14a-15a. 
The First Circuit also correctly noted that its 
holding and reasoning is “congruent with the case 
law” of the other circuits, which have long held 
editorial decisions about third-party content to be 
protected under Section 230.  See, e.g., Nemet 
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 
F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (Section 230 precluded 
suit based on the “structure and design” of website); 
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 413 (dismissing claim for 
alleged failure to protect users of site from sexual 
assault by other users, finding claim was another 
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way of treating site as the publisher of third-party 
posts); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“[L]awsuits seeking 
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or 
alter content—are barred.”). 
In an attempt to invent a disagreement where 
none exists, Petitioners mischaracterize the First 
Circuit’s reasoning.  Petitioners assert the First 
Circuit held immunity lies wherever third-party 
speech appears in the “chain of causation” of a 
plaintiff’s injuries.  Petition at 3; see also id. at 11, 
13, 14, 15, 18.  That is quite plainly not what the 
First Circuit held.  App. 17a.  Rather, in the court’s 
own words: “We hold that claims that a website 
facilitates illegal content through its posting rules 
necessarily treat the website as a publisher or 
speaker of content provided by third parties and, 
thus, are precluded by Section 230(c)(1),” and “a 
website operator’s decisions in structuring its 
website and posting requirements are publisher 
functions entitled to section 230(c)(1) protection.”  Id.  
The court nowhere stated or suggested that it 
applied Section 230 on some “chain of causation” 
theory, as Petitioners assert.2 
                                            
 
2 The First Circuit addressed causation only with regard to 
Petitioners’ state-law claim under Massachusetts’s unfair trade 
practices statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.  For that claim, 
Petitioners alleged that Backpage.com had been disingenuous 
because it had cooperated with law enforcement authorities, 
which “‘minimized and delayed’ any real scrutiny” of the 
website, and the continued existence of the website therefore 
harmed Petitioners.  App. 22a-23a.  The First Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision dismissing the ch. 93A claim, noting 
that it was “shot through with conjecture” and “pyramids 
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Nonetheless, proceeding from their mischaracter-
ization of the First Circuit’s decision, Petitioners 
point to Ninth Circuit cases to allege a conflict with 
their invented “but for” causation rule for Section 
230 immunity.  Those Ninth Circuit cases, however, 
are perfectly consistent with the First Circuit’s 
actual holding:  that claims attacking publisher’s 
actions and editorial choices concerning third-party 
speech are immunized by Section 230.  In Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), for 
example, the Ninth Circuit held the roommate-
matching website could not be held liable for user-
supplier content in a “comments” field on the 
website, despite the plaintiffs’ claims—indistinguish-
able from those here—that the website and its 
features otherwise “encouraged” users to state 
discriminatory preferences.3  Id. at 1174.  The Ninth 
                                                                                         
 
speculative inference upon speculative inference.”  App. 23a.  
Petitioners do not mention that this is the only portion of the 
First Circuit’s decision addressing causation, and they do not 
seek certiorari to review the decision of the First Circuit and 
the district court that their allegations about this state-law 
claim were implausible. 
3 Petitioners (at 14) quote a portion of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Roommates holding that Roommates was not 
entitled to Section 230 protection for another part of its website 
that required users to provide discriminatory preferences “as a 
condition of accessing its service,” because the site thereby 
became “the developer, at least in part, of that information.”  
521 F.3d at 1166 (emphasis added).  Petitioners fail to mention 
that they disclaimed any assertion that Backpage.com acted as 
a content provider, App. 11a n.4 (noting that “content creation” 
argument was “forsworn” by plaintiffs below), such that this 
part of the Roommates decision is irrelevant here.    
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Circuit observed—again consistent with interpre-
tations of Section 230 across the country—that any 
claim that can be “boiled down to the failure of an 
interactive computer service to edit or block user-
generated content,” amounts to an attack on the 
“very activity Congress sought to immunize by 
passing the section.”  Id. at 1172 n.32.  See also 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 
2009) (immunity lies where “the duty that the 
plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from 
the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or 
speaker’”); Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 
846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016) (Section 230 immunizes 
websites from claims based on “efforts, or lack 
thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user generated 
content.”). 
B. No Circuit Court Has Limited 
Section 230 Protections to 
“Neutral Intermediaries.”  
Petitioners next assert that the First Circuit’s 
decision is contrary to a national “consensus” that 
CDA immunity is limited to online providers that act 
as “neutral intermediaries” of online speech.  Not 
only does no such “consensus” exist—no federal 
appellate court has ever limited Section 230 in the 
way Petitioners suggest.  To the contrary, the courts 
routinely hold that websites are immune from 
liability for third-party content even if they 
“encourage” or “promote” actionable speech.  
Petitioners base their fictional “neutral inter-
mediary” test on passages in a few Section 230 cases 
that examine whether a website was responsible for 
developing the allegedly actionable content at issue.  
For example, in FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 
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1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009), the Tenth Circuit denied 
CDA immunity not because the website failed some 
abstract “neutrality” standard, but because the web-
site operator actually hired and paid researchers to 
obtain confidential telephone records illegally.  
These actions made it “responsible for the develop-
ment of the specific content that was the source of 
the alleged liability,” and thus potentially liable as 
an “information content provider” as defined in 
Section 230(f)(3).  Id. at 1198 (emphasis added). 
Here, Petitioners repeatedly disclaimed the argu-
ment that Backpage.com acted as an “information 
content provider.”  App. 11a.  In both the district 
court and the First Circuit, they conceded that all of 
the content that allegedly led to their injuries was 
supplied by third parties.  In light of this acknow-
ledgment, the First Circuit declined to address the 
argument advanced improperly by some amici 
urging that Backpage.com be treated as an “infor-
mation content provider” so as to avoid the protec-
tions of Section 230.4  App. 11a.  There is no conflict 
between the First Circuit’s opinion, which held that 
Petitioners’ claims treated Backpage.com as a pub-
                                            
 
4 Petitioners’ waiver also renders inapposite the Washing-
ton Supreme Court decision in J.S. v. Village Voice Media 
Holdings, LLC, 184 Wash. 2d 95 (2015), (Petition at 20), which 
was based entirely on the allegation that Backpage.com creates 
content.  The Washington court held (on a considerably more 
lenient pleadings standard than permitted in federal court), 
that plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage.com might be con-
sidered an information content provider could survive a dismis-
sal motion.  Id. at 103. Petitioners’ assertion that the First 
Circuit’s decision “creates a direct conflict with a state court of 
last resort” is wrong. 
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lisher of third-party content because they challenged 
publisher functions, and cases such as Accusearch 
addressing the issue of whether websites may be 
liable for creating and developing content them-
selves.   
Nor do any of the other circuit cases Petitioners 
cite impose an all-purpose “neutral intermediary” 
limitation on Section 230 immunity.  Several, like 
Accusearch, address the question of whether a 
website’s actions constituted content development,5 
the issue eschewed by Petitioners in this case.  Some 
of the cases referred to websites acting as inter-
mediaries or providing neutral tools (which users 
misused to post allegedly unlawful content) in the 
course of explaining that Section 230 immunity 
applied,6 but none have stated this as a dispositive 
test or even a relevant consideration for application 
                                            
 
5 Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358 (Facebook held immune where 
complaint “nowhere alleges or even suggests that Facebook 
provided, created, or developed any portion of the content that 
Klayman alleges harmed him”); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 
(“that Matchmaker classifies user characteristics into discrete 
categories and collects responses to specific essay questions 
does not transform Matchmaker into a ‘developer’ of the ‘under-
lying misinformation’”); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983 (America 
Online did act as an information content provider outside the 
scope of § 230 immunity by providing access to allegedly inac-
curate information). 
6 See, e.g., Doe v. GTE, 347 F.3d 655, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that service provider acted in a “passive” manner, but 
not holding that “passivity” is a requirement for Section 230 
immunity). 
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of Section 230.7  No circuit court has ever imposed 
such a requirement. 
In fact, the consensus is the opposite of what 
Petitioners assert.  Decisions from the circuit courts 
(and other courts) have routinely barred plaintiffs 
from pleading around Section 230 by alleging a 
website “encouraged” actionable third-party content.  
In the Jones v. Dirty World case, for example, the 
plaintiff sued a gossip website for disparaging 
remarks a third-party user posted about her. The 
district court refused to apply Section 230 because it 
concluded the site “intentionally encourage[d] illegal 
or actionable third-party postings,”8 but the Sixth 
Circuit reversed.  It noted that “[m]any websites not 
only allow but also actively invite and encourage 
users to post particular types of content” that might 
be “unwelcome to others.”  755 F.3d at 414.  The 
court held, however, that websites cannot be sued on 
an “encouragement” theory because that would 
“eclips[e] the immunity from publisher-liability that 
Congress established.”  Id.  “Congress envisioned an 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open internet, but the 
muddiness of an encouragement rule would cloud 
that vision.”  Id. at 415 (citation omitted).  
                                            
 
7 In fact, the cases Petitioners cite as supposedly creating a 
“neutral intermediary” standard, see Petition at 17-18 n.3, do 
not even use this phrase, much less suggest that it is a 
requirement for Section 230 immunity. See, e.g., Carafano, 339 
F.3d 1119; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980. 
8 Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 965 F. 
Supp. 2d 818, 821 (E.D. Ky. 2013), rev’d, 755 F.3d 398. 
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Similarly, in Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174, 
the Ninth Circuit rejected arguments that a website 
lost Section 230 immunity by implicitly encouraging 
unlawful speech.  In many cases, the court noted, “a 
clever lawyer could argue that something the 
website operator did encourage the illegality,” but 
such cases “must be resolved in favor of immunity, 
lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing 
websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, 
fighting off claims that they promoted or en-
couraged—or at least tacitly assented to—the illegal-
ity of third parties.”  Id. at 1174. See also Lycos, 478 
F.3d at 420 (“It is, by now, well established that 
notice of the unlawful nature of the information pro-
vided is not enough to make it the service provider’s 
own speech.”).  
“[T]here is simply no authority for the proposition 
that [encouraging unlawful content] makes the 
website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for 
the creation ... of every post on the site.”  Ascentive, 
LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 476 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The First Circuit’s decision is fully consistent with 
the consensus of courts across the country that 
application of Section 230 cannot turn on whether a 
website’s decisions about publishing third-party 
content are sufficiently “neutral” or instead allegedly 
“encourage” unlawful content. 9   
                                            
 
9 See also, e.g., S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, 2012 WL 3335284, 
at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (“[E]ncouraging defamatory 
posts is not sufficient to defeat CDA immunity.”); Goddard v. 
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(holding Google immune despite allegations it “encourages[,] 
collaborates in the development of … and, effectively, requires” 
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II. THERE IS NO NEED TO 
“HARMONIZE” FEDERAL STATUTES. 
Petitioners also assert the Court should grant 
certiorari to “harmonize” Section 230 with the civil 
remedy provision of the TVPRA, 18 U.S.C. § 1595.  
However, the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of 
Petitioners’ claims not because of a conflict between 
the terms of two statutes, but because Petitioners’ 
TVPRA claim sought to treat Backpage.com as a 
publisher of third party speech.  Petitioners’ claims 
are barred by Section 230, and no “harmonization” is 
needed.  
The TVPRA permits an individual who is a victim 
of sex trafficking to bring a civil action against the 
perpetrator or one who “knowingly benefits” from 
“participation in a venture” which that person “knew 
or should have known” violated the statute.  18 
U.S.C. § 1595(a).  Section 230 provides that an 
online provider may not “be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).   
The First Circuit found no conflict between the 
two statutes in this case.  It recognized that a 
TVPRA claim could conceivably lie against a website 
operator if it was “a participant in a sex trafficking 
                                                                                         
 
illegal content in ad program); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. 
Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz. 
2008) (ripoffreport.com immune despite allegations it encour-
aged defamatory reviews); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., 
Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (N.Y. 2011) (enforcing Section 230 
immunity despite claims that ShittyHabitats.com “encouraged 
users to post negative comments”). 
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venture”—for example if “the website operator 
helped to procure the underaged youths who were 
being trafficked.”  App. 16a.  But the court observed 
that plaintiffs alleged no such thing and, instead, 
“the TVPRA claims as pleaded premise[d alleged] 
participation on Backpage’s actions as a publisher or 
speaker of third-party content,” falling squarely 
within “[t]he strictures of section 230(c)” which 
“foreclose such suits.”  Id.  
Plainly, the First Circuit’s fact-bound holding—
that plaintiffs’ second amended complaint does not 
allege sufficient facts to demonstrate Backpage.com 
acted in any way other than as a publisher of third-
party content—provides no cause for review by this 
Court.  It does not point to a “conflict” between 
Section 230 and the TVPRA, any more than between 
Section 230 and any other federal statute estab-
lishing a civil cause of action.  Cf. POM Wonderful 
LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2239 (2014) 
(harmonizing provisions of Lanham Act and federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as they pertain to 
drink labeling).  Nor could it be said Section 230 and 
the later-enacted TVPRA are in such “irreconcilable 
conflict” that the TVPRA worked an implied repeal 
of Section 230.  Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 
395 (2009) (holding implied repeal is found only 
where two statutes “are in irreconcilable conflict, or 
where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the 
earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute’”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Here, there is nothing to reconcile.  The TVPRA 
allows plaintiffs to bring civil claims against their 
traffickers, while Section 230 precludes asserting 
such claims against website operators based solely 
on their actions in publishing third-party content.    
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Petitioners next erroneously claim that nothing 
in Section 230 “immunize[s] website operators from 
being held civilly liable for conduct that violates 
federal criminal law.”  Petition at 25.  But that is 
precisely what the statute does.  Section 230 
precludes all civil claims contrary to its protections.10  
Its broad prohibition against claims that treat a 
website as the “publisher or speaker” of third-party 
content is limited only by certain enunciated excep-
tions, none of which include civil claims based on 
federal criminal statutes.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e).   
The First Circuit correctly held that the exception 
in Section 230(e)(1) for criminal enforcement applies 
only to federal criminal prosecutions; it does not 
permit private plaintiffs’ civil actions based on 
alleged violations of criminal statutes.  App. 18a-20a.  
The “distinctions between civil and criminal 
actions—including the disparities in the standard of 
proof and the availability of prosecutorial discre-
tion—reflect a legislative judgment that it is best to 
avoid the potential chilling effects that private civil 
actions might have on internet free speech.”  App. 
20a.  In this regard, too, the First Circuit’s decision 
is consistent with every other federal court that has 
considered the issue.11 
                                            
 
10 Section 230 expressly preempts state laws, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(3) (“no liability may be imposed under any State or 
local law that is inconsistent with this section”), and also 
provides immunity for federal civil claims that would violate 
Section 230’s protections of online providers, see, e.g., Chicago 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights, 519 F.3d at 668-69 (Section 
230 precluded claim under Fair Housing Act). 
11 See, e.g., Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261, at *8 
(D.N.J. July 31, 2014) (“[T]he CDA exception for federal 
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Petitioners also argue their state-law claims 
survive because they are “not inconsistent” with 
Section 230.  Opp. at 23-25.  But subsection 230(e)(3) 
permits application of laws that, like Section 230, 
bar claims based on third-party content.  To the 
extent Plaintiffs argue Section 230 does not apply 
because they are not suing Backpage.com as a 
publisher, that is not true (as discussed), and in any 
event, this circular logic would render subsection 
230(e)(3) meaningless.  
III. THE PETITION RAISES NO LEGAL 
ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE MERITING 
REVIEW BY THIS COURT.  
The Petition does not raise a legal issue of impor-
tance for this Court’s review.  At bottom, Petitioners’ 
disagreement is not with the First Circuit’s legal 
analysis, which simply applied the plain meaning of 
Section 230 to the complaint before it.  Rather, their 
quarrel is with the scope of the immunity enacted by 
Congress.  As the First Circuit aptly explained:   
Congress did not sound an uncertain trumpet 
when it enacted the CDA, and it chose to grant 
broad protections to internet publishers ….  If 
the evils that [Petitioners] have identified are 
                                                                                         
 
criminal statutes applies to government prosecutions, not to 
civil private rights of action under [statutes] with criminal 
aspects.”) (emphasis added); Backpage.com v. McKenna, 881 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1275; M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 
809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1055-56 (E.D. Mo. 2011); Hinton v. 
Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 690-91 (S.D. Miss. 
2014); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490, at *5 n.5 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 
1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001) 
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deemed to outweigh the First Amendment 
values that drive the CDA, the remedy is 
through legislation, not through litigation.   
App. 32a.  Petitioners’ arguments that the dictates of 
Section 230 should give way to their private claims 
or their contentions about combatting sex trafficking 
are not appropriately addressed to this Court.   
Impassioned though they may be, the various 
amici curiae supporting the Petitioners add nothing 
to alter that conclusion.  Some of the amici try, in 
vain, to resurrect the long-waived argument that 
Backpage.com can be held liable to Petitioners as an 
“information content provider.”  See, e.g., Brief of 
States of Washington, Colorado, et al., at 7-10; Brief 
of National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children, et al., at 17-18.  However, it is well settled 
that an amicus curiae may not promote an argument 
renounced by a party.  New Jersey v. New York, 523 
U.S. 767, 781 (1998) (“[W]e must pass over the argu-
ments of the named amici for the reason that” the 
party to the case “has in effect renounced them.”), 
judgment entered, 526 U.S. 589 (1999).12 
Other amici would have this Court grant 
certiorari to drastically restrict the scope of Section 
230 in a way that Congress did not intend, and that 
no reported decision has ever done.  See Brief of 
Legal Momentum, et al., at 14-15.  Specifically, these 
amici maintain that Section 230 immunity is limited 
                                            
 
12 The rule that amici cannot independently present issues 
to justify certiorari is uniquely appropriate here, because the 
First Circuit refused to address the same arguments of the 
same amici offered below.  App. 11a n.6.  
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to the so-called “innocent” website operator who does 
not have “knowledge” that the site is being misused, 
with the result that “distributor” liability remains 
for a website that has “notice” of harmful content.  
But Section 230 contains no such limitation, and this 
whole-cloth argument would contradict the uniform 
interpretation of Section 230 and Congress’s intent. 
As the Fourth Circuit comprehensively explained 
in the first appellate decision to apply Section 230(c), 
“[l]iability upon notice would defeat the dual 
purposes advanced by § 230 of the CDA,” Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 333, namely, to protect free speech online 
and to incentivize self-regulation.  In particular, 
since any affirmative steps to screen content could 
also potentially put a website on notice of allegedly 
actionable postings, “notice” liability would have the 
perverse effect of disincentivizing such efforts.  Id. at 
332-33.  See also Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420 (“It is, by 
now, well established that notice of the unlawful 
nature of the information provided is not enough to 
make it the service provider's own speech.”).  The 
amici supporting Petitioners disagree with this as a 
matter of policy, but it is not the province of this 
Court to grant certiorari to rewrite the law.  
Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984) 
(“Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute 
because they might deem its effects susceptible of 
improvement.”) 
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CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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